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Abstract
Due to the rapid growth of machine learning tools and specifically deep net-
works in various computer vision and image processing areas, applications of
Convolutional Neural Networks for watermarking have recently emerged. In
this paper, we propose a deep end-to-end diffusion watermarking framework
(ReDMark) which can learn a new watermarking algorithm in any desired
transform space. The framework is composed of two Fully Convolutional
Neural Networks with residual structure which handle embedding and extrac-
tion operations. The whole deep network is trained end-to-end to conduct
a blind secure watermarking. The proposed framework simulates various at-
tacks as a differentiable network layer to facilitate end-to-end training. The
watermark data is diffused in a relatively wide area of the image to enhance
security and robustness of the algorithm. Comparative results versus recent
state-of-the-art researches highlight the superiority of the proposed frame-
work in terms of imperceptibility and robustness.
Keywords: Blind watermarking, data diffusion, deep convolution
networks,, CNN, FCN, transparency.
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1. Introduction
Digital watermarking was originally introduced in 1979 for anti-counterfeit
purposes [1] to distinguish between the original and counterfeit documents.
Since then it has been applied for identification of image ownership and
protection of intellectual property by hiding data such as logos and pro-
prietary information in images, videos and audios [2]. Another application
is the patient identification and medical procedure matching by hiding pa-
tients’ personal information in their medical images [3]. Other applications
have been proposed for watermarking such as broadcast monitoring [4], copy
control [5], device control [6] and legacy enhancement [7]. The most well-
known challenge in watermarking is that watermarked image which contains
hidden data is vulnerable to image processing algorithms for enhancement,
transformations like image compression and format conversion and undesired
artifacts such as transmission noises. Furthermore, watermarked images are
prone to intentional attacks which strive to change or corrupt the hidden
watermark data. Despite the extensive amount of research to battle these
problems, robustness, and imperceptibility are still the two key challenges
in watermarking algorithms. In another word, one major concern in mod-
ern watermarking is to preserve the hidden data as safe as possible in the
presence of attacks (robustness), while introducing subtle and undetectable
changes during the watermarking process, so that the watermarked image
would be indistinguishable from the original image (imperceptibility). An-
other problem which has attracted a great deal of research over the last two
decades is the blindness of watermarking algorithms, which increases their
complexity and may negatively affect their robustness and imperceptibility.
However, the blind watermarking methods [8, 9] are practically preferable
to informed/non-blind methods [10, 11], since the informed methods require
various side-information about watermark or cover image or embedding pa-
rameters for extraction.
Nowadays the application of machine learning tools in watermarking is
growing very rapidly, because of their effective solutions to embedding and
extraction processes [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Nevertheless, most of them gen-
erally utilize machine learning tools such as Support Vector Machine (SVM)
[18], Support Vector Regression (SVR) [19], Radial Basic Function Neural
Network (RBFNN) [20], and K Nearest Neighbor (KNN) [21] for specific
parts of watermarking procedure such as parameter optimization [12, 13],
prediction of transform domain coefficients [14, 15, 16] and attack estimation
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[17]. Among all the machine learning tools, deep networks and Convolutional
Neural Nets (CNN), have gained the most widespread attention in a large va-
riety of computer vision applications such as pattern recognition [22], image
classification [23] and object detection [24]. Very recently a few works have
emerged about the application of deep networks in watermarking [25, 26, 27].
Kandi et al.[25] proposed CNN based auto-encoder structures to hide water-
mark data in their feature maps. However, their proposed watermarking
method is non-blind, and a predefined embedding algorithm is applied for
embedding in auto-encoder feature maps. In [26], an end-to-end watermark-
ing network is introduced. However, the watermark data is embedded in
single blocks of the image, which leads to a uniform local embedding similar
to traditional methods.
Parallel to Li et al.[27], who have presented a unified system for wa-
termarking and steganography based on CNNs and Generative Adversarial
Networks [28], in this paper we introduce an end-to-end blind watermarking
framework (ReDMark) using Fully Convolutional Neural Networks (FCN),
which is capable of learning a new watermarking algorithm and surpass state-
of-the-art (including [27]) in terms of robustness and imperceptibility. The
proposed system consists of two FCNs for embedding and extraction, along
with a differentiable attack layer which simulates well-known attacks. Intro-
ducing differentiable attack layer as part of the network makes an end-to-end
training scheme feasible. It also leads to robust watermarking due to training
the network in the presence of attacks. To this end, we suggest a differentiable
approximate model for JPEG attack with the adjustable quality factor.
Dominant watermarking approaches use fixed methods such as swapping
coefficients in a transform domain. Nevertheless, ReDMark is capable of
learning several embedding patterns/masks in different transform domains
and in presence of various attacks. Consequently, the network explores suit-
able solutions customized for the suggested transform domain and required
attacks. On the other hand, only the constructed network can embed and
extract the watermark data based on the discovered watermarking patterns.
Hence, the proposed system introduces a secure method for hiding the wa-
termark data so that the recognition or replacement of the secret data along
the communication channel is not easy.
Another important characteristic of the suggested system, which leads
to improved security and robustness, is its capability to diffuse watermark
data among a relatively wide area of the image. In other words, the network
explores diffusion watermarking masks to share watermarking data among
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several image blocks, rather than simply swapping in a single block. Thus,
the watermarked image demonstrates impressive robustness against several
heavy attacks. Even if a meaningful part of image is corrupted or removed,
the extraction network is still able to extract the hidden watermark.
The last elegant feature of ReDMark is a strength-factor for controlling
the strength of the watermark patterns within the image, thanks to the novel
structure of the embedding network which is inspired by ResNet [29]. This
valuable feature enables us to control the trade-off between the robustness
and imperceptibility depending on situation and application requirements.
To make a long story short, our major contributions in the introduced
deep watermarking network include: 1. Proposing a residual watermarking
framework with specialized robustness against several specific attacks. 2. In-
troducing a strength factor tuner for controlling the trade-off among robust-
ness and imperceptibility. 3. Introducing a new differentiable approximation
of JPEG attack with any quality factor. 4. Proposing a novel diffusion wa-
termarking framework built on circular convolutional layers which leads to
exceptional robustness against various attacks.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows: In section 2 we review
related works in the literature. Technical details of the proposed framework
are discussed in section 3. The experimental results are presented in section
4. Finally, we conclude the paper with a short discussion in section 5.
2. Related Work
Since the advent of digital watermarking, an enormous amount of research
has been invested in developing new watermarking schemes with improved
capacity, robustness, imperceptibility, fidelity and security. Early methods
embedded the watermark data in the spatial domain by directly manipu-
lating image pixels to represent watermark data. Embedding watermark
bits in LBS of image pixels is an example of such methods [30]. For im-
proving robustness, the mainstream in literature is to embed the watermark
data in a transform domain by manipulating specific transform coefficients.
Some popular transform domains suggested for watermarking are DCT [31],
Wavelet [32], Hadamard [33], Contourlet [34] or a mixture of transforms [35].
Sadreazami et al.[36] proposed a multiplicative embedding method in Con-
tourlet domain, which requires statistical analysis for data extraction. They
simulate the behavior of watermarked image as normalized inverse Gaus-
sian distribution and propose a maximum likelihood detector for data ex-
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traction. Makbol et al.[37] utilize integer Wavelet transform and singular
value decomposition for watermarking. Another research [38] suggested a
reversible transform based on an over-complete dictionary for watermarking.
The authors in [39] introduced quaternion Hadamard transform domain for
watermarking in color images by using Schur decomposition. Liu et al.[40]
proposed a transform domain called fractional Krawtchouk transform for wa-
termarking. They use Dither modulation method [41] for embedding in this
domain.
Following increased applications of machine learning tools for various
tasks, some researchers started to apply these tools for different parts of
embedding and extraction in the watermarking process. For example, Hei-
dari et al.[17] presented a framework for blind image watermarking by the
redundant embedding of watermark data in multiple zones of the DCT spec-
trum. For extracting watermark data from the attacked image, they apply
SVM to recognize the least distorted zone of the spectrum. In [12], K-NN
regression method is utilized for estimating the optimum value of embedding
strength parameter in DCT domain for improving robustness and imper-
ceptibility. Zhi-Ming et al.[13], suggest to use RBFNN for optimization of
embedding strength in blocks of the cover image. The embedding strength
for each block is determined separately based on the block features obtained
by RBFNN. Authors in [14] use Wavelet domain for watermarking. They
predict some coefficients by SVR and use an embedding rule based on the
predicted values versus the real ones. Likewise, in [15], Lagrangian support
vector regression is utilized for prediction of coefficients and embedding pro-
cess in lifting Wavelet transform space [42]. Furthermore, a scaling factor is
assigned for embedding strength in each block which is estimated by genetic
algorithm. A similar embedding method is utilized by [16], which propose
Extreme Learning Machine (ELM) for prediction in the DWT domain. In
spite of vast research proposals for the application of machine learning tools
in watermarking, none of the above-mentioned methods propose a unified
watermarking framework based on machine learning approaches. In other
words, all of them apply machine learning tools on specific parts of the wa-
termarking process.
Among all machine learning tools, CNNs have gained extreme popular-
ity in the last decade. However, their assistive application for the water-
marking process is more recent. For example, Kandi et al.[25] applied two
auto-encoder CNN structures for feature extraction to be separately used for
positive and negative embedding. The same auto-encoder networks are used
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Figure 1: Block diagram of the proposed watermarking framework.
at the receiver side to obtain the feature maps and extract the watermark
data. In [26], two CNN networks are trained for embedding and extraction in
the presence of attacks. However, the watermarking networks are designed
for hiding a one-bit watermark in a single block. The most relevant research
to ours is the end-to-end trainable framework, HiDDeN [27] which is pro-
posed for data hiding in color images based on CNNs and GANs and may
be applied to watermarking and steganography. A noise layer is proposed in
the network for simulating attacks during the end-to-end training phase.
3. Proposed Watermarking Framework
In this paper, we propose an adaptive diffusion watermarking framework
(ReDMark) composed of two Fully Convolutional Networks with residual con-
nections. The proposed networks are trained end-to-end to conduct a blind
secure watermarking for grayscale images in the desired transform space. The
framework is customizable for the level of robustness vs. imperceptibility. It
is also adjustable for the trade-off between capacity and robustness. The
adaptive and flexible nature of the framework makes it easy to choose any
linear transform domain for embedding the secret watermark or to train the
watermarking network for higher resistance to specific attacks. Employing
a differentiable attack module as part of the network facilitates end-to-end
training and governs robust watermarking against various attacks. We elab-
orate on the technical details of the system modules and their functionalities
in section 3.1 and discuss the end-to-end training strategies in section 3.2.
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Figure 2: Embedding network: Trainable layers and fixed transform layers are
shown in different colors (Fixed layers may be initialized and released for training
as well).
3.1. Network Structure
Fig. 1 illustrates a block diagram of the system composed of three main
modules: CNN for embedding the watermark, differentiable attack layer for
simulating popular attacks, and CNN for extraction of the hidden watermark.
3.1.1. Embedding Module
As shown in Fig. 2, the embedding network structure is composed of two
transform layers, and five convolutional layers. For a H ×W grayscale cover
image and h×w binary watermark data, the embedding network embeds h×w
bits of watermark in a bigger cover image with H ×W pixels (Capacity =
h×w
H×W (bpp)). The embedding layers, compute the watermarking mask/pattern
within the transform domain. Then the residual mask is calculated in the
spatial domain by the inverse transform to be added to the original image
with a Strength Factor (α) weight. Further technical details of the pipeline
are discussed as follows.
Space to Depth (Reshape). Let’s assume the cover image can be properly
divided into blocks of size M × N and each block will be hosting at least
one watermark bit. Without loss of generality, we assume that the cover
image has h × w blocks required for the watermark bit length. Hence, we
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reshape the cover image into a tensor of size MN × h× w. Each column of
the generated tensor is the vectorized form of M ×N image blocks.
Transform Layer. This layer implements a reversible linear transform to
change the representation basis of the image from the spatial domain to a new
space such as a frequency domain. Although watermarking in spatial domain
provides higher capacity with lower complexity, it is shown that watermark-
ing in a transform domain is more secure and robust against intentional or
random attacks and image processing techniques [43]. To perform the wa-
termarking process in a new domain, we need two transform and inverse
transform layers for input and output interface of the embedding network.
The suggested transform layers can be fixed to any standard transform such
as DCT, wavelet or Hadamard. However, it is also possible to pre-assign an
arbitrary transformation to the layer and let the network fine-tune the trans-
form layer throughout the training process within a specific training strategy.
Considering the proposed rearrangement of the cover image in the previous
paragraph, the transformation layer is simplified into a 1 × 1 convolution
layer, as we apply the transform on each block independently. Depending on
the new space dimension, we need nT convolution masks in accordance to nT
transformation basis. Hence, every M ×N block is reshaped to 1× 1×MN
tensor and convolved with 1×1 transformation masks. Output of each of nT
masks is calculated by:
fT = [fT(θ)]nT×1 =
[
MN∑
k=1
f(k)D(θ, k)
]
nT×1
=
[dθ]nT×MN [f ]MN×1 = DnT×MN fMN×1 (1)
where f is the 1 × 1 ×MN block tensor reshaped as a column vector, dθ
is the vectorized 1 × 1 convolution mask representing the weights of one
neuron and fT(θ) is the output of θth filter mask. D = [dθ] represents the
nT×MN transform matrix, where its rows contain the corresponding neuron
weights and fT demonstrates the transformed feature space, i.e., outputs of
all neurons. There are no bias values for neurons. Special cases of Equation
(1) for DCT and Hadamard transforms are discussed in the appendix. Similar
calculations are required for any other linear transform space.
There is no obligation for using a fixed known transform in the transfor-
mation layers. To elaborate, the transform layers of the proposed framework
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may be initialized to any desired transform or even random values and re-
leased for training during end-to end training of the whole network. We only
need to constrain the two input and output transform layers of the two em-
bedding and extraction networks to be equivalent inverse transforms. In this
way we expect the network to seek new transform domains for watermarking.
However, in this work we use a fixed transformation layer for proof of the
framework concept.
Embedding layers. The output of the transformation layer is concatenated
with the watermark image, shaping the input tensor of size (MN+1)×h×w
for the embedding network. This network is composed of circular and nor-
mal convolutional layers, which are responsible for embedding the watermark
patterns into the transformed image blocks. As shown in Fig. 2, some layers
of the embedding network perform 2 × 2 circular convolution, which lead
to expanding the receptive field of neurons in the final layers. Hence, this
innovative structure empowers diffusion watermarking, so that the water-
mark data is shared and distributed among adjacent blocks. Furthermore,
the embedded watermark added to each block of the cover image is a super-
position of symbols in the wide receptive field, i.e., the own block and its
neighbors. This brilliant property improves security and robustness of the
proposed framework against several attacks.
Skip Connection and Strength Factor. As displayed in Fig. 2, the water-
marked image is produced by summing the output of the embedding network
with the original cover image. This structure guides the network to produce
the residual watermark data. This helps the embedding network to learn
the additive watermarking symbols more efficiently, i.e., the network weights
converge faster during the training stage. On the other hand, the proposed
network structure empowers the framework to incorporate a Strength Factor
to adjust the strength of generated symbols before summation with the cover
image. Addition of this elegant tuning volume to a trained network enables
the system to amplify or attenuate the generated symbol in the watermarked
image and control the level of robustness vs. imperceptibility (PSNR/SSIM)
based on our requirements. During the network training, strength factor is
fixed to one.
3.1.2. Attack Layer
In this part, we elaborate on the structure of the attack layer as shown
in Fig. 1. The proposed framework simulates various attacks as a differen-
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tiable network layer to facilitate end-to-end training. Furthermore, keeping
the attacks in the training loop guides the network to learn more robust wa-
termarking patterns to resist real-world attacks in communication channels.
A network trained in the presence of an attack will produce watermarked
images that are more robust to that specific attack.
Interestingly, learning robust watermarking for specific attacks may lead
to robustness against some other attacks, due to similarities in their natures.
In this work, we train separate networks with well-known attacks and analyze
their robustness against many other attacks. We also train a network with
multiple simultaneous attacks which is shown to resist a wider range of at-
tacks simultaneously. Various attacks simulated for network training in this
work are briefly explained below, and details of the training are discussed in
section 4.
Noise Attack. This is a random white noise added to the watermarked image
in every iteration of training. Hence, the back-propagated loss signal passes
through the additive noise which is fixed for every iteration. We may apply
various noise types such as uniform noise and Gaussian noise. Likewise, salt
& pepper noise follows the same logic, where either of values 0 or 255 are
assigned to random image pixels with a specific probability.
Random cropping attack. This improves watermarking performance in the
presence of cropping attack since the network learns to redundantly embed
watermark data in different regions. Random cropping is implemented by
suppressing or turning off neurons in random block regions. The process is
similar to dropout layers introduced in [44].
Smoothing Attack. We use a normalized unit mask (all-ones matrix) for
smoothing windows, as shown in Equation (2).
Hmask =
1
a2
1 . . . 1... . . . ...
1 . . . 1

a×a
(2)
Thus, the attack layer, in this case, is a simple convolutional neuron with
constant weights. We may use any convolution mask for various FIR (Finite
Impulse Response) filters, to simulate any band filtering attack. For example,
the layer mask can be set to Gaussian filter or a sharpening filter.
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Figure 3: Differentiable approximate model for JPEG attack layer
JPEG Attack. All the attacks discussed so far, are inherently differentiable
and can be directly implemented into the network layer. However, JPEG
coding involves some non-differentiable operations. Thus, we need a differen-
tiable approximation of the process to simulate the JPEG attack in a network
layer. The JPEG compression includes the following steps: transferring im-
age blocks to DCT domain, dividing by a quantization matrix determined by
a quality factor and rounding the results to integer values. Similarly, JPEG
decoding involves inverse operations as follows: Multiplying the coefficients
by the same quantization matrix, then transforming to the spatial domain.
A complete simulation of JPEG attack, as shown in Fig. 3, consists of all the
stages mentioned above: DCT transform, division by quantization matrix,
rounding, multiplication by quantization matrix, inverse DCT transform (see
Transform Layer in section 3.1.1. Among all the mentioned steps, rounding
operation is non-differentiable and needs to be approximated with a differ-
entiable operation, to facilitate back propagation of the training gradients.
We simulate rounding operation by a uniform noise in the range [-0.5, o.5].
Mathematical rounding is practically a subgroup of the suggested approxi-
mation, in other words, we are simulating a larger family of distortions than
normal JPEG. Equation (3) demonstrates the proposed rounding simulation
method:
Iw∗DCT =
(
IwDCT
Q
+ σ
)
×Q = IwDCT + σQ (3)
where IwDCT is the watermarked image in the DCT domain, Iw∗DCT is its
approximated quantized version, Q is the quantization matrix of a required
quality factor and σ is the uniform noise [-0.5, o.5]. The equation implies
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that the rounding effect appears more strongly for larger elements of the
quantization matrix, which are towards higher frequencies. This guides the
network to gradually reduce the embedding strength in higher frequencies of
the transform domain.
Mixture Of Attacks. Multiple attacks may be combined in the attack layer
to train a robust watermarking network for the mixture of chosen attacks.
The training procedure, in this case, is slightly different, as in each iteration
of training the network randomly selects one of the attacks with a given
probability. Hence, the back propagated gradients are passed through the
selected attack layer. The switching mechanism of the multi-attack layer is
illustrated in Fig. 4. As shown in the figure, we model the random selection
of attacks as a roulette wheel which assigns a probability to each attack.
Thus, in each of the training iterations, only one type of attack is allowed to
pass through the multiplexer to affect the training loss.
Figure 4: Multi-attack layer: In every iteration, only one type of attack is applied
on the watermarked image
3.1.3. Extraction Module
As illustrated in Fig. 5, the extraction module is structurally simpler
than the embedding network. This module is supposed to extract water-
mark data from the input image. Since the watermark data is embedded
in the transform domain, the extraction module incorporates a copy of the
transform layer utilized for the embedding module, to represent the water-
marked image in the same basis. Other network layers learn to extract the
watermark data in the transform domain.
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Figure 5: The extraction network
3.2. Network Training and Evaluation Metrics
As can be seen in Fig. 1, the trainable network modules (embedding and
extraction units) are trained together within an end-to-end setup including
the trainable and non-trainable network layers. The main training objectives
are to establish embedding and extraction networks which can generate safe,
high-quality watermark images and robustly recover the hidden data from
the watermarked images. In other words, each network has an independent
objective function. The embedding network is supposed to generate a water-
marked image with maximum quality and minimum distortion compared to
the original image. On the other end, the extraction network is responsible
for maximizing the extraction rate of the hidden watermark or equivalently
minimizing Bit Error Rate (BER), as defined by Equation (4).
BER(Wt,W
′
t) =
∑Lw
l=1XOR(Wt(l),W
′
t(l))
Lw
(4)
where Wt is the original binary watermark and W ′t is the extracted water-
mark. Lw represents the watermark string length. This Lw bits of watermark
may be embedded redundantly in the cover image. Further discussion about
redundant embedding is in section 4.2. We utilize two metrics for evaluat-
ing the image quality in training and test stages. The Structural Similarity
Index (SSIM) is a perceptual metric employed as a training loss function to
quantify degradation of image quality caused by the watermarking process
and transmission. SSIM estimates the structural variation of the two images
through the Equation (5):
L1 = SSIM(I, Iw) =
(2µIµIw + c1)(2σI,Iw + c2)
(µ2Iµ
2
Iw
+ c1)(σ2I σ
2
Iw
+ c2)
(5)
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where I is the cover image, Iw is the watermarked image, µI and µIw are the
mean values of I and Iw respectively, σI and σIw represent their variances and
σI,Iw is the covariance of (I, Iw). In this equation c1 and c2 are two constants
of the metric which are set to 10−4 and 9× 10−4 for our experiments.
For comparing the watermarking quality of the ReDMark (imperceptibil-
ity of the produced watermarked images) against state-of-the-art competi-
tors, we exploit the well-known PSNR metric (Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio),
as shown by Equation (6):
PSNR(I, Iw) = 10 log
(
W ×H ×MAX2∑
s
∑
t |I(s, t)− Iw(s, t)|2
)
(6)
where W and H are the image dimensions, and MAX stands for the maxi-
mum value of image pixels (for grayscale images, MAX = 255).
Based on the above discussion, for the end-to-end training of the multi-
objective network, we employ a weighted combination of the embedding and
extraction loss functions, as shown in Equation (7).
L = γL1 + (1− γ)L2 (7)
where γ is the ratio of losses and L1, L2 are the loss functions of the em-
bedding and extraction networks. L1 simulates imperceptibility or quality
of the watermark image, while L2 represents the watermark extraction rate
and robustness. We use SSIM metric for L1 and binary cross entropy for L2:
L2 = −
∑
all
pixels
2∑
c=1
yc log(pc) = −
∑
all
pixels
y1 log(p1) + (1− y1)log(1− p1) (8)
where pi values are the outputs of the extraction network representing the
probability of watermark bits. Watermark data is generated by thresholding
these values.
Since there is a trade-off between the two loss-functions (imperceptibility
vs. robustness), the process of network training is a multi-objective optimiza-
tion. The flow of gradients from the last layers of the extraction network to
the first layers of the embedding network implies that only L2 gradients
back-propagate through the extraction network. However, for the embed-
ding layers in the head of the pipeline, gradients of the combinatorial loss L
back-propagate to train the embedding network weights.
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4. Experimental Results
The proposed framework is implemented by Tensor-flow [45] and executed
on NVIDIA GeForce® GTX 1080 Ti. We use CIFAR10 [46] and Pascal VOC
[47] datasets for training the network. The dataset of 49 standard test images
from the University of Granada [48] is used for most of the numerical analysis
and comparative evaluations. We demonstrate the superiority of ReDMark
by comparing with two state-of-the-art watermarking systems [27], [38]. For
a fair comparison against the concurrent work of Zhu et al.[27], we evaluate
our system on COCO dataset [49].
To demonstrate the capabilities of our framework, we train three different
networks with various attacks: 1) Gaussian-Trained-Network (GT-Net) is
trained under Gaussian noise attack (σ=3), 2) JPEG-Trained-Network (JT-
Net) is trained under JPEG attack (quality=70), 3) Multi-Attack-Trained-
Network (MT-Net) is trained in the presence of multiple attacks with equal
probabilities, including salt & pepper (4%), Gaussian noise (σ=3), JPEG
(quality=70), and mean smoothing filter (3×3).
Implementation details and the network configuration are discussed in 4.1.
Training strategies and working with the trained networks are discussed in
4.2. We analyze the imperceptibility and robustness of the trained networks
under several attacks in 4.3 and 4.4, then compare the results to the state-of-
the-art watermarking algorithms in 4.5. Finally, some watermarking patterns
of the trained networks and their technical characteristics are discussed in
4.6. The source codes of the framework will be uploaded on Github shortly.
4.1. Network Configurations
In our experiments, we set the block size to 8× 8 and use training image
patches of size 32×32. So we have 16 blocks per input image which is used for
embedding a 4 × 4 watermark pattern. We use the DCT transform domain
in our experiments, however any other linear transform may be applied. The
embedding network (as shown in Fig. 2) consists of two interface-transform-
layers implemented by 1 × 1 convolutional masks to perform the change-of-
basis DCT operation and inverse DCT transform. The embedding network
between the transform layers is composed of one 1×1 convolution and four 2×
2 circular convolutional layers with Exponential Linear Unit (ELU) activation
[50]. All the layers of embedding network contain 64 convolution filters. The
basic structure of the extraction network is very similar to the embedding
module. As demonstrated in Fig. 2, the first layer is a transform layer
15
Table 1: The network and training parameters
Parameter Value description
(M,N) (8,8) Size of network blocks
(W,H) (32,32) Size of training image patches
(w,h) (4,4) Size of watermark
Iteration No. 1000000 Training iteration number
LR 10−4 Learning rate
mo 0.98 Momentum of optimization
γ 0.75 for GT-NET and JT-NET, Relative loss function weights
0.5 for MT-NET
composed of 64 DCT filter masks (1×1 convolutions). Then we have another
1 × 1 convolution layer and three 2 × 2 convolution layers with 64 filters
per layer and ELU activation functions. A final 1 × 1 convolutional layer
consisting of one neuron with sigmoid activation generates the watermark
probability map. A threshold is applied to this output to produce the final
watermark. Strides of all filters in embedding and extraction modules are set
to one. Width and height of images throughout the network are constant, as
a result of using circular convolution.
4.2. Experimental Setup
For training process, CIFAR10 [46] and Pascal VOC2012 [47] datasets
are combined to shape our training set of cover images. CIFAR10 consists of
60000 tiny RGB images (32×32), which is divided to training/test sets of size
50000/10000 images. We combine the 50000 CIFAR10 training set images
with Pascal dataset and convert them to grayscale to be used as cover images
for training. Since the Pascal dataset contains large, high-resolution images,
we extract 32 × 32 patches from random positions of dataset images. We
want our dataset to contain a range of smooth to high-frequency patterns for
better training. Hence, among the set of generated patches we select a subset
which equally contains all intensity variances. The final training set is a
combination of two datasets containing around 334K grayscale image patches.
In the training phase, we assign random watermarks to image patches in
every iteration. In this way, we avoid biasing the network with a specific
watermark pattern. We utilize the stochastic gradient descent algorithm for
optimization and training. Some training configuration and parameters are
shown in Table 1. The training time for single attack networks is about
9 hours with 1000,000 iterations. For multi-attack training, the number of
iterations is doubled and consequently, its training is twice slower than the
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Table 2: Robustness and imperceptibility results of our networks.
Imperceptibility Robustness (% BER)
α
PSNR
(dB) SSIM
Gaussian Noise
(σ)
Salt &
Pepper (%)
Cropping
(%)
Grid Crop
(%)
patterned-pixel-
elimination (lines)
5 15 25 2 6 10 10 20 30 20 30 40 3 6 9
MT-Net
1.0 35.93 0.966 0.0 2.6 12.7 0.0 0.1 0.9 6.0 11.3 17.1 3.3 6.9 11.4 1.4 2.6 5.0
0.8 37.84 0.978 0.1 6.4 18.2 0.1 0.6 2.7 6.0 11.5 17.1 4.4 8.5 13.4 1.9 3.4 6.5
0.6 40.24 0.987 2.4 14.5 25.6 2.9 4.5 9.1 7.7 13.1 18.8 8.3 13.0 18.0 4.0 6.3 10.3
JT-Net
1.0 39.77 0.985 0.6 17.0 27.7 14.9 30.9 36.3 5.8 11.3 16.8 29.3 35.7 39.4 3.3 5.4 9.9
0.8 41.53 0.990 4.3 22.6 31.7 20.5 34.5 38.9 7.2 12.6 18.3 32.8 38.2 N 5.0 7.6 12.5
0.6 43.66 0.994 13.4 29.2 36.1 27.6 38.3 N 13.3 18.1 22.9 37.0 N N 11.5 14.5 19.2
GT-Net
1.0 44.14 0.992 0.5 17.8 28.9 14.6 31.6 37.1 5.6 10.9 16.5 3.4 6.8 11.2 0.6 1.5 3.2
0.8 45.73 0.994 2.4 23.0 32.6 19.1 34.8 39.5 5.7 11.1 16.6 3.7 7.2 11.6 0.9 2.1 4.2
0.6 47.52 0.996 8.0 28.8 36.6 25.0 38.4 N 7.5 12.8 18.3 6.1 9.7 14.0 3.0 4.5 7.2
Table 3: Robustness and imperceptibility results of our networks. (Continued)
Imperceptibility Robustness (% BER)
α
PSNR
(dB) SSIM
JPEG (quality) Gaussian Blur(radius)
Sharpening
(radius)
Median
(window size)
Resizing
(scale)
90 70 50 1 1.6 2 1 5 10 3 5 7 0.5 0.75 1.5
MT-Net
1.0 35.93 0.966 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.1 29.0 N 0.0 0.1 0.2 2.9 N N 5.9 0.0 0.0
0.8 37.84 0.978 0.0 0.4 3.5 1.6 34.3 N 0.1 0.3 0.6 6.1 N N 12.3 0.3 0.1
0.6 40.24 0.987 1.6 4.2 11.8 8.6 39.0 N 0.9 2.4 3.2 13.4 N N 21.2 3.8 2.6
JT-Net
1.0 39.77 0.985 0.1 0.2 1.3 24.7 N N 0.8 1.6 2.1 28.9 N N 28.7 8.8 6.3
0.8 41.53 0.990 1.3 2.3 6.7 28.7 N N 1.4 3.4 4.4 31.7 N N 32.0 14.5 12.2
0.6 43.66 0.994 7.9 10.7 17.3 32.9 N N 5.6 9.1 10.4 34.3 N N 35.0 21.0 19.2
GT-Net
1.0 44.14 0.992 9.6 N N N N N 0.2 0.9 1.4 N N N N 37.9 1.6
0.8 45.73 0.994 16.0 N N N N N 0.6 1.6 2.3 N N N N 39.3 3.2
0.6 47.52 0.996 24.2 N N N N N 2.5 3.8 4.7 N N N N N 7.2
training of the single attack network.
For evaluating the trained networks, we embed 1024 bit (32 × 32) wa-
termarks in 512 × 512 gray-scale images. The watermark is embedded with
four times redundancy, as the cover image contains 64 × 64 image blocks.
For this purpose, a 64 × 64 bit redundant plane is formed so that each bit
of watermark is repeated four times in a regular pattern in this plane. We
refer to it as watermark plane. Then the cover image is partitioned into
32 × 32 sub-images, and the watermark plane is partitioned into 4 × 4 sub-
watermarks for feeding to the embedding network. The embedding network
produces watermarked sub-images which are tiled with each other to form
the watermarked image. The watermarked image is then passed through sev-
eral attacks to simulate the real world situation. For the extraction phase,
we follow the same protocol. First, the attacked watermarked image is parti-
tioned into 32× 32 sub-images. These sub-images are fed into the extraction
network, which extracts 4 × 4 patches of the watermark plane. Then these
patches are tiled to form a 64 × 64 redundant watermark plane. Finally, a
voting procedure is applied on the corresponding bits to produce the 1024-bit
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watermark data.
4.3. Quantitative Results
To analyze the trained networks (GT-Net, JT-Net, and MT-Net), we test
them on all 49 images in the Granada dataset [48]. The imperceptibility of
each watermarked image is presented in terms of PSNR and SSIM. Tables 2
and 3 demonstrate the PSNR and SSIM of the watermarked images produced
by all the trained networks with three different strength factors (α). PSNR
and SSIM of a single image are calculated by averaging 20 watermarked
images with different random watermarks. We follow the same process for
all the 49 images of Granada dataset and present their average values as
the network performance. To demonstrate the robustness of the proposed
networks, BER of extracted watermarks under several attacks are calculated
for three different strength factors. Similar to PSNR and SSIM, all the
numeric results of both tables represent the average result over all images in
the test dataset with 20 random watermarks per image.
Robustness of the networks is tested for three levels of each attack. The
symbol N in the tables stands for Non-robust and is used when the BER
value is around 50%. Gaussian noise is applied with three different stan-
dard deviations. The parameter in salt and pepper and cropping attacks is
the percentage of changed pixels. To show the strength of the proposed net-
works in diffusion watermarking and data sharing, a new attack is introduced
called Grid cropping, in which random 8 × 8 blocks throughout the image
are suppressed to zero. For the Gaussian blur and sharpening (/unmask) at-
tacks, the attack parameter represents the filter’s radius. The Median filter
parameter demonstrates the filter mask size. In resizing attack, the image
is resized by the shown scale and resized back to original image based on
bilinear interpolation. Similar to cropping and salt and pepper, we conduct
the grid cropping attack in three different levels, representing the percentage
of suppressed blocks. The BER results in 2 declare that even if a meaning-
ful number of image blocks are cropped, we can still extract the majority
of the watermark data. The next rarely used attack is the patterned-pixel-
elimination attack, in which a text is written on the watermarked image.
The attack parameter represents the number of text lines in “Natural script”
handwriting with the font size of 40. Similar to Grid cropping, this attack
highlights the network’s capability in diffusing the watermark data through-
out the cover image. Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that the MT-NET exhibits
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Figure 6: box-plot representation of PSNR and SSIM for the trained networks.
Each figure illustrates the variations of PSNR/SSIM versus α.
overall better robustness compared to the other two networks, at the ex-
pense of lower PSNR and SSIM as expected. This is similar in spirit to a
general belief in Multi-Task Learning (MTL) [51], which states training one
neural network for multiple similar tasks leads to overall better performance
compared to training separate networks for every single task. As shown in
Tables 2 and 3, regardless of some exceptions, MT-NET demonstrates better
extraction rate (lower BER) than the other two networks. This is even true
for the attacks that JT-Net and GT-Net are trained for (JPEG attack and
Gaussian noise attack). Another important characteristic of the system is
that the robustness of the watermarking networks can be controlled by two
means. In the training mode, when the network confronts more powerful
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attacks, the embedding module embeds stronger watermark symbols in the
image. This strong embedding leads to more robustness at the expense of
lower PSNR. In spite of that, in a trained network we can still control this
trade-off by tuning the watermarking strength factor. As shown in Tables 2
and 3, for a given attack and a fixed network, increasing the strength factor
(α) results in lower BER values.
For further details about the network behavior, box-plots of Fig. 6 display
the range and variations of PSNR and SSIM for all the watermarked images.
Tables 2 and 3 only display the average outcomes of the proposed algorithm
on the Granada dataset. In Fig. 6, each box corresponds to a strength factor
and shows the distribution of SSIM and PSNR for all of the test images. Each
row in Fig. 6 is for one of the proposed networks. Increasing the strength
factor lowers PSNR, and SSIM values.
4.4. Qualitative Results
For visualization purposes, the watermarked images produced by the
three networks are illustrated in Fig. 7. In Fig. 7 a random 128-bit wa-
termark is embedded in Barbara image from the Granada dataset [48] by
using GT-Net, JT-Net, and MT-Net. The absolute difference between the
cover image and the watermarked image is illustrated to show the water-
mark pattern. For better visualization, this difference is multiplied by 10.
Furthermore, a small area of the image is zoomed for better illustration. We
may notice in the difference images that amplitudes of the produced artifacts
vary in different areas of the cover image. These variations in the difference
matrices imply that the watermark symbols are adaptively embedded based
on the local features of the image.
Fig. 8 demonstrates some attacks on Barbara. For each attack, the
attack level/parameter is displayed in parenthesis. The extraction BER for
the attacked images are also reported using MT-NET with α = 0.6.
4.5. Comparison With State-of-the-art
In this section, we compare our network performance against [27] and [38].
The authors of HiDDeN framework [27] use COCO [49] for their experiments.
For a fair comparison, we match our testing conditions to HiDDeN, i.e., 30-
bit random watermarks are embedded in 128 × 128 color images. Hence,
we redundantly embed in all channels of YUV space. In each channel, the
parameter α is adjusted so that PSNR of both systems are similar. Cropout
and Dropout attacks are applied based on their definition. According to
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Cover Image
GT-Net, α=0.2 JT-Net, α=0.2 MT-Net, α=0.2
GT-Net, α=0.4 JT-Net, α=0.4 MT-Net, α=0.4
GT-Net, α=0.6 JT-Net, α=0.6 MT-Net, α=0.6
Figure 7: The watermarked image produced by three networks for various strength
factors. A square region of the watermarked image and its amplified absolute
difference with original image are enlarged for visualization.
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Salt and pepper
(10%) BER=8.8%
Cropping (30%)
BER=18.5%
Resizing (0.5)
BER=18.1%
Gaussian blur (Rad=1.6)
BER=36.3%
Gaussian noise (σ=25)
BER=26.0%
Patterned Elimination
(lines=16) BER=18.0%
Grid crop (30%)
BER=13.4%
Sharpenning (Rad=10)
BER=3.5%
Median window (3× 3)
BER=10.3%
Figure 8: Visual effects of various attacks on Barbara. For each attack, the attack
level/parameter and the resulting extraction BER are shown for MT-NET (α=0.6)
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Table 4: Comparison of MT-NET to network introduced in [27]
Method
Robustness (BER%)
JPEG (Q=50) Cropout (30%) Dropout (30%) Crop (3.5%) Gaussian Filter(σ=2)
HiDDeN [27] 37.0 6.0 7.0 12.0 4.0
ReDMark (MT-NET, α= 1) 25.4 7.5 8.0 0.0 50.0
Table 5: Comparative results of robustness (BER) to Jpeg attack with three differ-
ent qualities. In all networks the SSIM is nearly the same to that of [38] for a fair
comparison.
Method JPEG50 70 90
Random Matching Pursuit[38] 26.74 17.64 1.98
ReDMark (MT-NET), α = 0.4 25.68 16.49 9.30
ReDMark (JT-NET), α = 0.8 6.75 2.32 1.31
Table 4, although ReDMark is not trained on cropout and dropout attacks,
BER values under these two attacks are comparable to HiDDen.
The other competitors are Random Matching Pursuit [38]. Since they
have reported BER results for JPEG attack, we only present the relevant re-
sults for this attack. The comparisons are conducted with the two networks
JT-Net and MT-Net against their best results on Granada dataset [48] which
is used by them to report their results. 1024 bit random watermarks are em-
bedded into 512 × 512 dataset images, and BER values are reported. The
strength factor of the networks is specifically set to adjust the SSIM to the
same value of the competitor’s. Then BER values of the extracted water-
marks are compared in similar watermark qualities in terms of SSIM metric,
while our PSNR is still better. Table 5 shows that ReDMark outperforms
Random Matching Pursuit in terms of robustness (BER).
4.6. Diffusion pattern / data sharing
In this section, we demonstrate the ability of our networks in data sharing
and diffusion among neighboring blocks. In our framework, we strategically
use circular convolution to avoid zero-padding of the feature maps, to en-
hance the watermark strength and robustness. Fig. 9 demonstrates how the
application of circular convolution leads to further diffusion and data shar-
ing on the image borders. The circular convolution mask (white window) in
Fig. 9 sweeps the opposite block edges, whenever it is on the borders. Conse-
quently, all the neurons equally share the watermark data and the descending
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Figure 9: Circular convolution effect for the central tensor block (MN × h×w), is
equivalent to repeating the tensor around itself and applying normal convolution.
In this figure, the 8 faded tensors are repeated versions of the central tensor.
GT-NET JT-NET MT-NET
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
DCT coefficient
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
E
ne
rg
y
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
DCT coefficient
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
E
ne
rg
y
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
DCT cofficient
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
E
ne
rg
y
Figure 10: First row: Watermark diffusion patterns of three networks ; Second row:
Accumulated frequency energy curves of the networks.
effect of zero-padding on watermarking will be avoided. To investigate the
watermark patterns generated in neighboring blocks, we design a simple ex-
periment. A watermark mask is formed with only one non-zero bit. Then we
check the produced patterns by the embedding networks on a constant cover
image, in which all the pixels are set to 128. However, this pattern alone
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does not give us enough insight without considering the effect of embedded
zeroes. This is because the networks embed separate symbols for 0 and 1.
Thus in the second step, we do the same experiment with another watermark
mask of all zero bits. We call the difference of the produced watermarked
images in the two mentioned experiments as diffusion pattern. The produced
patterns are invariant to the location of embedded non-zero bit, i.e., the same
8×8 block patterns are shifted according to the location of embedded 1. The
diffusion patterns of the three trained networks are illustrated in Fig. 10.
As illustrated in the diffusion patterns, employing circular convolution
leads to scattering the watermark data across the whole image, i.e., the 4×4
watermark bits are diffused across the 32× 32 image block. The second row
of Fig. 10, demonstrates frequency energy curves of the diffusion patterns,
which are calculated by summing absolute values of DCT coefficients of all
sixteen 8 × 8 blocks of the diffusion pattern. The accumulated DCT coeffi-
cients are arranged on the horizontal axis in zigzag order of the DCT block,
i.e., starting from DC coefficient DCT (0, 0) towards the highest frequency
DCT (7, 7). With a closer look to diffusion patterns and their frequency en-
ergy curves in the DCT domain, it can be concluded that GT-NET embeds
the watermark in high frequency coefficients of the cover image, JT-NET
embeds in low frequency coefficients. However, MT-NET employs a more
distributed embedding strategy with more concentration on low and middle
frequency bands. It is worth to mention that the diffusion pattern frequency
curves are invariant to the location of embedded 1. As demonstrated in Fig.
10, all the networks have learnt to avoid embedding in DC coefficient, due
to destructive effects on image quality and PSNR.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented ReDMark, an adaptive diffusion watermark-
ing framework, composed of two Fully Convolutional Neural Networks with
residual connections. Deep neural networks can be used to optimize existing
algorithms. But in our work, the mentioned networks handle embedding and
extraction processes. In other words, these networks learn a new watermark-
ing algorithm in any desired transform domain. The networks were trained
end-to-end to conduct a blind secure watermarking in the desired domain.
The framework can be customized for the level of robustness vs. imper-
ceptibility by tunable parameters during training and test of the networks.
The proposed framework simulates various attacks as a differentiable network
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layer to facilitate end-to-end training. For instance, a differentiable approxi-
mation of JPEG attack is developed, which largely improves the watermark-
ing robustness to this attack. In this work, we presented three network
instances of ReDMark, each of which trained under different attacks. We
demonstrated the different nature/behavior of the trained networks, where
each of them embeds in particular spectral regions due to their different train-
ing strategies. An important characteristic of the suggested system, which
leads to improved security and robustness, is its capability to diffuse/share
watermark data among a relatively wide area of the cover image. We visu-
ally illustrated this data sharing and diffusion-watermarking using diffusion
patterns. Furthermore, we proposed two attacks to experimentally prove the
effect of this unique characteristic on improving the watermarking robust-
ness. Comparative results against recent state-of-the-art works demonstrate
the superiority of ReDMark in terms of imperceptibility and robustness.
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Appendix A.
Appendix A.1. Expansion of equation (1) for DCT transform:
If fTM×N is the two dimensional DCT transform of fM×N , it can be written
as:
fT(u, v) =
1
MN
M−1∑
m=0
N−1∑
n=0
f(m,n) cos
(
(2m+ 1)upi
2M
)
cos
(
(2n+ 1) vpi
2N
)
(A.1)
By reshaping the matrices f and fT to vectors of lengthMN , the θth element
of the vector fT can be written by change of variables of m =
⌊
k
M
⌋
, n =
k −mM , u = ⌊ θ
M
⌋
and v = θ − uM .
fT(θ) =
1
MN
MN−1∑
k=0
f(k) cos
((
2
⌊
k
M
⌋
+ 1
) ⌊
θ
M
⌋
pi
2M
)
cos
((
2
(
k − ⌊ k
M
⌋
M
)
+ 1
) (
θ − ⌊ θ
M
⌋
M
)
pi
2N
)
(A.2)
in which f(k) is the kth element of the vector f and so:
fT(θ) =
MN−1∑
k=0
f(k)D(θ, k) (A.3)
in which:
D(θ, k) =
1
MN
cos
((
2
⌊
k
M
⌋
+ 1
) ⌊
θ
M
⌋
pi
2M
)
cos
((
2
(
k − ⌊ k
M
⌋
M
)
+ 1
) (
θ − ⌊ θ
M
⌋
M
)
pi
2N
)
(A.4)
Appendix A.2. Expansion of equation (1) for Hadamard transform:
Hadamard transform of an N ×N block f is defined by fT = HfH, where
H is the N × N Hadamard matrix. Elements of the transformed matrix fT
are calculated by:
fT(u, v) =
N−1∑
n=0
H(u, n)A(n, v) (A.5)
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where
A(n, v) =
N−1∑
m=0
f(n,m)H(m, v) (A.6)
fT(u, v) =
N−1∑
n=0
H(u, n)
N−1∑
m=0
f(n,m)H(m, v) =
N−1∑
m=0
N−1∑
n=0
f(n,m)H(u, n)H(m, v) (A.7)
Equation (A.7) is reshaped by change of variables m =
⌊
k
N
⌋
, n = k −mN ,
u =
⌊
θ
N
⌋
and v = θ − uN , as bellow:
fT(θ) =
N2−1∑
k=0
f(k)D(θ, k) (A.8)
where:
D(θ, k) = H(u, n)H(m, v) =
H
(⌊
θ
N
⌋
, k −
⌊
k
N
⌋
N
)
H
(⌊
k
N
⌋
, θ −
⌊
θ
N
⌋
N
)
(A.9)
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